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Forum Selling and Domain-Name Disputes
Daniel Klerman*
The system for resolving domain-name disputes is unique in that it
gives the complainant—a trademark owner who claims that a domain
name violates its mark—the unilateral ability to choose the arbitration
provider. As a result, providers, whether motivated by profit or prestige,
have incentives to favor the complainant. Empirical analysis confirms
that complainants choose providers who are more likely to decide cases
for the trademark owner, rather than based on speed. The domain-name
dispute-resolution system should be modified to allow both complainant
trademark owner and respondent domain-name registrant to strike an
equal number of arbitration providers. This reform would give providers
an incentive to be neutral rather than biased.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration of domain-name disputes is different. Unlike other
dispute-resolution systems, the complainant in domain-name disputes
unilaterally chooses the arbitration provider. Because arbitration
providers are for-profit entities or have nonfinancial reasons to want to
hear more cases, they have an incentive to favor the complainant. The
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idea that domain-name arbitration favors the complainant—the
trademark owner—has been the dominant view among commentators,1
but that view has been challenged by the most sophisticated empirical
analysis on the subject—that of Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo.2 Kesan and
Gallo argue that trademark owners choose the fastest arbitration provider,
not the one most likely to favor the complainant.3 As a result, they
conclude that competition among arbitration providers enhances
efficiency and does not produce bias.4
This Article reviews the data and argues that the dominant view is
correct. Although the data are not sufficient to fully explain how
trademark-owner complainants chose arbitration providers, it is clear
they favored the arbitration providers—the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) and the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”)—
who were most likely to rule in favor of the complainant, even though
WIPO was the slowest provider.5 The idea that complainants were
motivated by the prospect of pro-trademark decisions, rather than speed,
is confirmed by the fact that eResolution, which was least likely to rule
in favor of the complainant, was chosen least often, even though it was
faster than WIPO.6 eResolution eventually exited the domain-name
dispute-resolution market.
The dynamics of the domain-name dispute-resolution system provide
an example of forum selling. The idea of forum shopping is well-known:
plaintiffs choose the court that is most favorable to them. Forum selling
is the idea that courts and judges are not passive participants in forum
selection.7 Sometimes they actively seek more cases, and to do so they
favor the party with the power to select the forum—which is usually the
plaintiff.8 While most courts and judges do not want to hear more cases,
some seek the power, prestige, and benefits to their localities that higher

1. See infra Part II (analyzing the literature on the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy (“UDRP”)).
2. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services—An
Empirical Re-Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
285, 326 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part III (explaining that Kesan and Gallo’s data more firmly support the conclusion
that win rates matter more to complainants than the speed of the dispute resolution).
6. See infra Part III (reexamining Kesan and Gallo’s data to refute the contention that
complainants selected providers for speed rather than pro-trademark decisions).
7. Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (2016);
Gerhard Wagner, The Dispute Resolution Market, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2014).
8. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 242–43.
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caseloads can bring. When plaintiffs have broad jurisdictional choice,
those courts and judges tilt the law in favor of the plaintiff, because it is
the plaintiff who ordinarily has the power to choose the court. The result
is that the judges and courts that are most pro-plaintiff have a
disproportionate effect on the law, and the law takes a pro-plaintiff tilt.9
The prime example of forum selling is patent litigation in the Eastern
District of Texas.10 For the last decade, judges in that district have openly
sought more patent cases. They have publicly stated they find such cases
more interesting than other parts of their docket.11 It is also undisputed
that the large number of patent cases in their district has benefited the
local bar and economy. Although judges in the Eastern District of Texas
claim that they attract cases because they are more efficient and possess
more expertise, their decisions also favor patent plaintiffs in a number of
subtle, but important ways: they almost never grant summary judgment,
they allow plaintiffs to de facto choose the judge, and they almost never
stay cases pending reexamination.12 As a result, more than a quarter of
United States patent cases are filed in the Eastern District of Texas—even
though that district is home to no major technology companies and no
major cities.13
Other examples of forum selling include state-court class-action
litigation, pre-modern common-law adjudication in England, and
bankruptcy.14 Domain-name dispute-resolution is, of course, different,
because it involves arbitration rather than public courts. Nevertheless,
the concept of forum selling fits very well, if not better, in the context of
domain-name dispute resolutions.15 Arbitration providers and arbitrators
have a greater incentive to hear more cases, compared to courts and
9. Id.
10. Id.; see generally J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 631 (2015) (examining the history and implication of forum shopping for patent cases,
particularly in the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of Texas, and the Eastern District of
Virginia).
11. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 271.
12. Id. at 250–65, 277–80.
13. Id. at 248–50.
14. Id. at 285–99. For an in depth discussion on forum selling in pre-modern common law
adjudication in England, see generally Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the
Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007) (examining the history of judicial
fees and the shaping of common law through judicial competition).
15. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 285–96, 298–99. Klerman and Reilly’s article, Forum
Selling, has a brief section on domain disputes. Id. at 296–98. That section concludes: “It would
be helpful if others analyzed the data to see how the simple statistics produced by Mueller and Geist
can be reconciled with the more sophisticated analysis produced by Kesan and Gallo.” Id. at 298.
This Article fills that gap.
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judges, because arbitration providers and arbitrators are private
businesses and individuals with direct financial incentives to hear more
cases. In contrast, judges ordinarily have no financial stake in their
caseloads, and usually have no desire to hear more cases. Only a few
judges want to hear more cases, and their incentives are ordinarily subtle
and nonfinancial. In addition, the rules of jurisdiction and venue usually
mean that only a small number of courts can hear a particular case. Even
judges who want to hear more cases ordinarily cannot affect their
caseloads very much.16 In contrast, parties can usually choose among
numerous arbitration providers. In the domain-name context, the
complainant’s provider choice is restricted to providers approved by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”).
Nevertheless, during the period studied in this Article, there were four
approved providers, so there was substantial room for choice and
competition.17
Part I discusses the domain-name dispute-resolution system. Part II
reviews the literature. Part III reanalyzes Kesan and Gallo’s data and Part
IV discusses a simple, easily implementable reform. Each party should
be allowed to strike some providers. This would eliminate the most
biased providers and give all providers an incentive to be neutral. Part V
concludes.
I. THE UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
Since December 1999, the Uniform Domain-Name DisputeResolution Policy (“UDRP”) has governed trademark disputes relating to
many of the most important domain names.18 That policy was
promulgated by ICANN and applies to all domain names ending in .com,
.net, and .org, as well as many other top-level domains. All persons or
entities that register a covered domain name agree to be bound by the
UDRP.19 Under the UDRP, a trademark owner may file a claim against
the person who registered a domain name alleging that the domain name
“is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark in which the
complainant has rights,” that the registrant has “no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name,” and that the domain name “has
16. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 271, 303–04.
17. This Article focuses on the period from December 2000, when the UDRP went into effect,
until June 2001, when eResolution exited the market.
18. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Oct. 24 1999),
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Oct. 26 2016)
[hereinafter ICANN Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy].
19. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
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been registered and is being used in bad faith.”20 Although the UDRP
refers to legal concepts that vary from country to country—such as
whether a registrant has “rights or legitimate interests”—it does not
provide any guidance on choice of law, leaving wide scope to arbitrator
discretion.21
The trademark owner unilaterally selects the dispute-resolution
provider from among those approved by ICANN.22 Each disputeresolution provider has its own roster of arbitrators and its own
procedural rules, including rules about selecting arbitrators for particular
cases.23 If the arbitrator decides in favor of the complainant, the domain
name is canceled or transferred to the complainant. 24 The relevant
domain-name registrars have adopted the UDRP and implement the
decisions of the arbitrators without the need for court orders or other legal
or administrative proceedings. Both the trademark-owner complainant
and the domain-name registrant respondent retain the right to submit or
appeal their cases to a court.25 Nevertheless, because court proceedings
are much more expensive than arbitrations under the UDRP, for most
disputes, the UDRP arbitration is final and decisive.26
By early 2000, there were four approved dispute-resolution providers:
WIPO, NAF, eResolution, and the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”).27 As of 2016, eResolution and CPR
no longer provide dispute-resolution services under the UDRP, but three
other providers have been approved: the Asian Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Centre, the Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for
Internet Disputes, and the Arab Center for Domain Name Dispute
Resolution.28 Because this Article analyzes the first eighteen months of
20. Id. ¶ 4(a).
21. Fabien Gélinas, U.D.R.P.: Utopie de la Décision Rapide et Pondérée ou Univers du Droit
Réduit au Pragmatisme?, in DROIT DU COMMERCE ÉLECTRONIQUE 577, 599–602 (Vincent
Gautrais ed., 2002).
22. ICANN Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 18, ¶ 4(d).
23. See, e.g., Dispute Policy and Procedural Rules, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/rules/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) (World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”) rules); Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UPRP), FORUM: ARBITRATION MEDIATION INT’L, http://www.adrforum.com/UDRP (last visited
Oct. 26, 2016) (National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) rules).
24. ICANN Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 18, ¶¶ 2, 4(i).
25. Id. ¶ 4(k).
26. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 2, at 304 n.71 (noting that only sixty-five of the more than
2,000 UDRP arbitrations decided by mid-2002 had been taken to court).
27. Id. at 312.
28. List
of
Approved
Dispute
Resolution
Service
Providers,
ICANN
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en (last visited Oct. 12, 2016)
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the UDRP, and because CPR heard only a handful of disputes, this Article
focuses on three providers: two for-profit corporations—NAF and
eResolution—and one nonprofit corporation—WIPO.
II. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE UDRP
In 2001 and 2002, two academic studies questioned the fairness of the
UDRP. Milton Mueller, a Professor of Information Studies at Syracuse
University, studied decisions rendered under the UDRP through October
2000.29 He found that WIPO arbitrators decided for complainants in 67.5
percent of cases, and that NAF arbitrators decided in favor of
complainants 71.5 percent of the time.30 In contrast, eResolution
arbitrators decided in favor of complainants only 44.2 percent of the
time.31 Not surprisingly, WIPO and NAF had dominant market shares—
61 percent and 31 percent respectively—whereas complainants chose
eResolution only 7 percent of the time.32 Mueller also examined other
factors that might influence the selection of a dispute-resolution provider,
including price, a complainant’s country of origin, and speed.33 Mueller
concluded that the “complainant loss rate, though not the only factor
correlated with the choice of a provider, is a highly significant one,” and
that “[t]hese findings have important implications for the fairness of
ICANN’s procedure.”34 Mueller identified the key problem as
“complainant selection of the dispute providers [which] has a tendency
to reward providers who deliver name transfers.”35
Michael Geist, a law professor at the University of Ottawa, reached
similar conclusions and explored how the arbitration providers “curry

[hereinafter List of Approved Providers].
29. Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy, 17 INFO. SOC’Y 151, 156, 159 (2001) (noting in Figure 1 the UDRP proceedings
per month from January to October 2000, and in Table 5 the market share of resolution service
providers (“RSPs”) from January to October 2000).
30. Id. at 157.
31. Id. For a critique of Mueller’s study, see generally Ned Branthover, UDRP—A Success
Story: A Rebuttal to the Analysis and Conclusions of Professor Milton Mueller in “Rough
Justice”, INTA INTERNET COMMITTEE (May 6, 2002),
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAUDRPSuccesscontraMueller.pdf. Mueller also
performed a follow up study. Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain
Name Trademark Disputes under ICANN’s UDRP (Syracuse Univ. Sch of Info. Studies,
Working Paper, 2002), http://ccent.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/markle-report-final.pdf.
32. Mueller, supra note 29, at 159.
33. Id. at. 158–60.
34. Id. at 160.
35. Id. at 161.
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favor with potential complainants.”36 He noted, “the most prominent
difference between providers remains case outcome. Simply put,
complainants win more frequently with WIPO and NAF than with
eResolution.”37 Geist tried to explain why win rates differed among
providers, even though their rosters of arbitrators were relatively
similar.38 He argued that NAF and WIPO did not assign cases randomly
to arbitrators, but rather their systems appear “to be heavily biased toward
ensuring that a majority of cases are steered toward complainant-friendly
panelists.”39 Geist also noted that NAF “regularly distributed press
releases heralding recent decisions,” and that these “releases took on a
distinctly pro-complainant tone.”40 That is, NAF touted its decisions in
favor of trademark-owner complainants to attract business. In addition,
NAF made it difficult for respondents (domain-name registrants) to apply
for extensions of time.41
Jay Kesan, a law professor at the University of Illinois, and Andres
Gallo, an economist at the University of North Florida, performed the
most sophisticated empirical study of the UDRP system. They used
multinomial logistic regression to test whether “the probability of
36. Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in
the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903, 906 (2002) [hereinafter Geist, Fair.com?]. See
also Michael Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias Allegations and the ICANN
UDRP, aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/fairupdate.pdf (updating analysis from the 2002 article with more
recent data). For a critique of Geist’s work, see The UDRP by All Accounts Works Effectively:
Rebuttal to Analysis and Conclusions of Professor Michael Geist in “Fair.com? and
“Fundamentally Fair.com?”, INTA INTERNET COMMITTEE (May 6, 2002),
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAUDRPSuccesscontraGeist.pdf.
37. Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 36, at 909.
38. Id. at 907.
39. Id. at 936. For a more recent analysis of arbitrator selection that confirms Geist’s
conclusions, see Michael Ettedgui, 2012 Domain Dispute Study, DNATTORNEY.COM (Aug. 28,
2012), http://www.dnattorney.com/NAF-DomainNameDisputeStudy-Aug28.pdf; Zak
Muscovitch, 2010 Domain Name Dispute Study, DNATTORNEY.COM (Mar. 2010),
http://www.dnattorney.com/study2010.shtml.
40. Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 36, at 907.
41. Id. at 908–09. NAF engaged in similar practices in its consumer-credit arbitration business.
In that business, arbitration providers are usually specified in form contracts drafted by the bank,
credit card company, or other business. Because consumers seldom pay much attention to those
provisions, the financial company de facto chooses the arbitration company unilaterally. In 2009,
the Minnesota Attorney General filed suit against NAF alleging that it was biased. The parties
settled the suit, and the consent judgment barred NAF from arbitrating consumer disputes, although
NAF retained the right to arbitrate domain-name disputes. Press Release, State of Minnesota,
National Arbitration Forum Barred from Credit Card and Consumer Arbitrations under Agreement
with Attorney General Swanson (July 19, 2009) (on file with author). For a discussion of the
Minnesota suit against NAF, see Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World of
Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 427–30 (2010). But see generally Christopher R.
Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 89 (2012) (defending NAF).
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selecting one of the providers depends on the complainant bias or on the
provider’s efficiency in handling the cases.”42 To measure bias, the
authors calculated the percentage of cases won by complainants in cases
decided by each of the three providers—WIPO, NAF, and eResolution.43
To analyze “efficiency” or “performance,” the authors measured the
duration of cases decided by each of the three main dispute resolution
providers.44 Providers that decided cases more quickly were considered
better in terms of efficiency and performance.45 Kesan and Gallo
concluded that “the performance of providers can be considered a better
measure in determining the selection of providers by complainants than
the supposed bias of the system favoring complainants.”46 I discuss
Kesan and Gallo’s methodology in greater depth in the next section.
Although they were careful to point out the limits of their analysis, others
summarized their conclusions in starker terms. David Simon, for
example, stated that, according to Kesan and Gallo, “provider selection
is mostly a matter of provider efficiency rather than provider bias. In
other words, the complainants choose providers that decide disputes the
fastest.”47
III. REANALYSIS OF KESAN AND GALLO’S DATA
Kesan and Gallo generously shared their data with me. My analysis
focuses on the period from December 2000, when the UDRP went into
effect, until June 2001, when eResolution exited the market. Table 1
below summarizes the key variables:

42. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 2, at 328.
43. Id. at 327.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 331.
47. David A. Simon, An Empirical Analysis of Fair Use Decisions Under the Uniform DomainName Dispute-Resolution Policy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 65, 70 (2012).
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics (December 1999–June 2001)48
Provider

Market Share

Percent for
Complainant

Duration (days)

eResolution

6.3%

60.1%

48

NAF

32.7%

81.1%

38

WIPO

60.4%

80.0%

56

WIPO and NAF had the largest market shares and together received
over 90 percent of the cases. eResolution heard less than 7 percent.
WIPO and NAF arbitrators also ruled for the complainant most often (80
percent or more), while eResolution arbitrators ruled for the complainant
only 60 percent of the time. These raw statistics are consistent with the
idea that complainants chose dispute-resolution providers based on how
favorably they ruled for the complainant, although these simple statistics
do not, of course, prove causation. The fact that even eResolution
decided for the complainant more than half of the time reflects the nature
of disputes under the UDRP. Many were simple cyber-squatter cases in
which the respondent clearly had no right to the domain name and did not
even respond to the complaint.
NAF resolved cases the fastest—on average, in only thirty-eight days.
WIPO was the slowest, taking 50 percent more time. eResolution was
intermediate in speed, taking, on average, ten days longer than NAF, but
eight days fewer than WIPO. These statistics are inconsistent with the
idea that complainants chose providers based on speed. If speed were the
main determinant, WIPO should have had the smallest market share, not
the largest, and NAF and eResolution should have had the largest and
second largest market shares, yet together they garnered less than 50
percent of case filings.
It should be noted that Table 1 helps explain eResolution’s small share
and the dominance of NAF and WIPO, but it does not explain why WIPO
had nearly twice the market share of NAF. WIPO and NAF ruled for the

48. Market shares do not add up to exactly 100 percent because CPR heard a small number (0.6
percent) of the cases. A case is counted as “for Complainant” if the domain name was transferred
from the registrant (respondent) to the trademark owner (complainant). A small number of domain
names were cancelled, but not transferred. Including those cases in the analysis would not change
the results significantly. Duration is the average number of days between commencement of the
case and issuance of the final decision. A significant number of cases were terminated without a
decision by the panel, either because the complainant withdrew the complaint or because the case
settled. Those cases are included in calculations of market share, but not in the calculation of
percent for complainant and duration.
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complainant with nearly the same frequency (80.0 percent and 81.1
percent respectively), so complainant-win rates do not provide a basis for
WIPO’s dominance. In addition, NAF was considerably faster, so if one
looked just at speed and complainant-win rates, one would think that
NAF, not WIPO, should have had the largest market share. Clearly, other
factors had an influence in the choice between NAF and WIPO. NAF
was seen as American, whereas WIPO had a more international profile,
which resulted in non-United States complainants favoring WIPO.
WIPO also had the prestige that stems from its status as an international
nonprofit organization.49 In addition, WIPO marketed its services
extensively and held educational seminars and workshops for lawyers
who might file with them.50
Analysis of trends over time does not significantly change these
conclusions. Table 2 summarizes the trends.
TABLE 2: Change over Time (December 1999–June 2001)51
Provider

Market Share

Percent for
Complainant

Duration (days)

eResolution

-3.1%

-16.2%

-0.5

NAF

-9.3%

+10.0%

+2.9

WIPO

+11.4%

-2.7%

+19.8

Table 2 indicates that the system was pretty stable over the relevant
period. eResolution and NAF lost some market share, and WIPO gained,
but their relative positions (WIPO with the most cases and eResolution
with the fewest) did not change. To the extent that there were changes,
they are flatly inconsistent with the idea that duration was the key factor.

49. Telephone Interview with Karim Benyekhlef, Professor of Law, University of Montreal
(Mar. 28, 2016); Telephone Interview with Scott Donahey, Arbitrator (Apr. 29, 2016); Telephone
Interview with Fabien Gélinas, Faculty of Law, McGill University (Apr. 18, 2016); Telephone
Interview with Joëlle Thibault, Mediator and Ombudsman (Apr. 25, 2016).
50. Telephone Interview with Karim Benyekhlef, Professor of Law, University of Montreal
(Mar. 28, 2016); Telephone Interview with Scott Donahey, Arbitrator (Apr. 29, 2016); Telephone
Interview with Fabien Gélinas, Faculty of Law, McGill University (Apr. 18, 2016); Telephone
Interview with Joëlle Thibault, Mediator and Ombudsman (Apr. 25, 2016).
51. This table compares outcomes from the first five months of the UDRP (December 1999 to
April 2000) to the last three months in which eResolution accepted domain-name cases (April to
June 2001). The earlier period is longer than the later period, because only one case was filed in
December 1999 and fewer than ten cases were decided in March 2000, so the percentage for
Complainant and Duration cannot be calculated reliably without including March and April 2000
cases.

13_KLERMAN_DOCUMENT8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Forum Selling and Domain-Name Disputes

2/10/2017 2:16 PM

571

WIPO became noticeably slower, with average case length increasing by
nearly three weeks, yet it was the only provider whose market share
increased. In contrast, eResolution actually became slightly faster, yet its
market share fell. NAF’s speed decreased only slightly, yet it also lost
market share. Looking at the percentage for complainant column
(“Percent for Complainant”) helps explain the trends only for
eResolution.
eResolution became significantly less complainant
friendly—its percentage of decisions for the complainant fell 16.2
percent—and its market share fell 3.1 percentage points. Although 3.1
percentage points might not seem like a large decline—because
eResolution started with only 8.6 percent of the cases—a 3.1 percentage
point decline is actually a loss of more than one third of its market share.
Looking at the trends in more detail reinforces these conclusions.
Figure 1 shows monthly trends in market share.
FIGURE 1: Monthly Trends in Market Share (December 1999–June
2001)

Market share shifted significantly in the early months of the UDRP.
WIPO was the first dispute-resolution provider approved by ICANN, and
it received the first (and only case) filed in December 1999.52 So, for the
first month of the UDRP, WIPO had 100 percent of the market. NAF

52. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 2, at 312.
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entered the market in January 2000, and it took more than half the cases
filed in that month—reflecting the fact that American trademark owners
were the first to take advantage of the UDRP. In over 70 percent of cases
filed in January 2000, the complainant was based in the United States.
Because NAF was also based in the United States, it was favored by
United States complainants. As more non-United States complainants
filed cases under the UDRP, NAF’s market share fell, because nonUnited States complainants tended to favor WIPO. eResolution also did
relatively well in January and February, with its market share rising to 11
percent. After that, things stabilized—WIPO and NAF took about 60 and
35 percent of the market, respectively, and eResolution’s share declined
to about 5 percent.
Figure 2 shows that the complainant win rates varied somewhat,
especially for eResolution.
FIGURE 2: Trends in Complainant Win Rates (December 1999–June
2001)

Win rates for WIPO and NAF started very high (over 80 percent),
declined slightly until July 2000, but then held steady around 80 percent
for the rest of the period studied. eResolution’s win rates varied much
more—largely because it heard, on average, only twelve cases per month,
and percentages of small numbers are statistically more likely to be
variable. In some months, eResolution’s win rates were as high as NAF’s
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and WIPO’s (about 80 percent), but in a majority of months,
eResolution’s win rates were much lower (between 40 percent and 60
percent). It should be noted that the large variations in eResolution’s win
rates do not seem to be reflected in volatility in its market share. As will
be discussed below, this is important for Kesan and Gallo’s analysis,
which concludes that complainants made decisions based on monthly win
rates.
FIGURE 3: Trends in Case Duration Over Time (December 1999–
June 2001)

Figure 3 demonstrates that all providers started off relatively fast in
terms of case-completion time. This is mostly a statistical anomaly.
Duration is measured by averaging the speed of cases terminated in a
particular month. Therefore, by necessity, cases decided in the first few
months of the UDRP were decided relatively quickly. If it took longer to
decide them, their duration would appear in statistics for later months.
Nevertheless, after the first few months, some notable differences became
apparent. eResolution seemed to have had some difficulty processing
cases in the first half of 2000—the duration of its cases spiked at about
sixty days in June 2000. Thereafter, its case durations fell and remained
intermediate between WIPO and NAF, with a dip at the end of the period,
when eResolution was actually faster than NAF. It is possible that
complainants formed an impression of eResolution as slow based on its
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early 2000 performance and never updated their view. That would
provide some support for Kesan and Gallo’s conclusion that speed
(efficiency) was an important factor in arbitration-provider selection,
although it would be inconsistent with their analysis of monthly data.53
WIPO became slower and slower through 2000, with average duration
peaking at over sixty days in January and February of 2001, and declining
only slightly thereafter. NAF held steady as the fastest provider for
nearly the entire period. As noted above, the fact that WIPO became
significantly slower but also increased its market share is inconsistent
with the idea that complainants chose arbitration providers based on
speed.
This Article’s reanalysis of Kesan and Gallo’s data refutes the idea that
complainants chose dispute resolution providers based on speed
(efficiency), and provides some support for the idea that complainants
were influenced by win rates. WIPO and NAF, whose arbitrators ruled
most often for complainants, garnered over 90 percent of the market. In
contrast, eResolution—whose arbitrators ruled less often for the
complainant and whose complainant win rate declined—had a small and
declining market share. WIPO, which was the slowest provider and
whose speed decreased, received the dominant market share and its
market share increased over time. Meanwhile, NAF and eResolution,
which were faster and whose speed did not change significantly from
2000 to 2001, witnessed declines in their market shares.
Given their different conclusions based on the same data, it is
important to discuss how Kesan and Gallo analyzed the data. Kesan and
Gallo ran a series of multinomial logistic regressions. 54 The unit of
observation was the case.55 The dependent variable was which provider
was chosen, and the independent variables measured duration and
complainant win rates for each provider.56 For duration variables, the
natural logarithm of average monthly duration was used.57 There are a
number of problems with Kesan and Gallo’s analysis.
First, it should be noted that Kesan and Gallo’s results were not that
strong. For both the duration and win-rate variables, Kesan and Gallo
used two variables for each provider: one measuring duration or win rates
for the current month and the other a lagged variable measuring duration

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See supra Part II (discussing the conclusions from Kesan and Gallo’s study).
Kesan & Gallo, supra note 2, at 326–29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
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or win rates for the prior month.58 Thus, Kesan and Gallo ran regressions
with 12 independent variables (3 current-month win-rates variables, one
for each of the providers, 3 lagged win-rate variables, 3 current-month
logged duration variables, and 3 lagged logged duration variables). Only
five of these twelve independent variables produced statistically
significant coefficients—two lagged win-rate variables (eResolution and
WIPO), two current-month logged duration variables (NAF and
eResolution), and one lagged logged duration variable (WIPO). 59 So,
Kesan and Gallo were only able to obtain statistical significance for half
of the duration variables and less than half of the win-rate variables.
Even for the statistically significant variables, the direction of the
effects was not consistent. Thus, if Kesan and Gallo’s hypothesis—that
speed is the dominant factor in provider choice—is accurate, the
regression results should indicate that an increase in the duration of one
provider predicts decreases in the market share of that provider and
increases in market shares for the other providers. That was true only for
eResolution.60 For WIPO, the results were exactly the opposite—
increases in WIPO duration predict increases in WIPO’s market share
and decreases in NAF’s and eResolution’s market share.61 Results for
NAF were not consistent one way or the other. The predictions based on
the win-rate variables were also inconsistent.62
Thus, for reasons that will be discussed more below, the regression
results are inconclusive, pointing sometimes to duration and sometimes
to win rates as explaining choice of arbitration provider. Kesan and Gallo
realized the limited nature of their results. They acknowledge, for
example, that for “the efficiency variable for WIPO, the results are not
consistent with the efficiency hypothesis.”63 In addition, rather than
claiming definitive conclusions, they suggest more research:
“[P]erformance should receive more attention than the supposed system
bias.”64
Second, Kesan and Gallo’s results are actually weaker than the ones
they published, because they miscoded some of the data. For example,
some cases decided by eResolution were coded as having been decided
by other providers. Andres Gallo generously corrected the data and reran
58. See id. (“[W]e tested a series of similar models using the variables mentioned previously. .
. . . The results suggest that only [five variables] are significant . . . .”).
59. Id.
60. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 2, at 329.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 331.
64. Id.
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the regressions. In the new regressions, only three of the independent
variables are statistically significant: lagged WIPO win rate, lagged
logged WIPO duration, and logged current-month eResolution duration.
Thus, only one fourth of the 12 variables initially tested remain
significant. In addition, the coefficients on all variables were much
smaller, indicating smaller effects than previously measured.
Third, even the corrected results might not be reliable, because some
coding problems remain. For example, it appears that nearly all cases
heard by eResolution in 2001 were inadvertently dropped from the
analysis.
Fourth, multinomial logistic regression analysis does not fully capture
the way win rates affect market share. Logistic regression works by
analyzing how changes in the independent variables affect market share.
This is problematic because, as noted above, there was not a lot of change
over time. It appears that complainants were not choosing arbitration
providers based on the providers’ performance in the month the case was
filed or the prior month. Instead, the data suggest that they made
decisions based on coarser, longer-term information. As noted above
when analyzing the graphs, eResolution’s complainant win rates varied
considerably from month to month, but complainant decisions did not;
yet Kesan and Gallo’s regressions attempt to measure responses to
month-to-month variation. One way of understanding the problems with
the multinomial logistic regression framework, as applied to these data,
is to imagine a data set only slightly simpler than the real data. Suppose,
as in Table 3, there were three providers whose market shares and
complainant win rates did not change over time.
TABLE 3: Simulated Data
Provider

Market Share (%)

Percent for
Complainant

1

60%

60%

2

30%

30%

3

10%

10%

In this simulated data, there is a perfect correlation between each
provider’s market share and the percentage of cases each provider
decided for the complainant. One would therefore expect that the
regression analysis would indicate that complainant win rates were very
strong predictors of market share. Nevertheless, multinomial logistic
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regression fails to yield such results. In fact, regression coefficients
cannot be calculated. The problem is that there are three independent
variables (Percent for Complainant for each of the three providers), and
six coefficients need to be calculated (two for each of the three
independent variables, because coefficients need to be calculated for each
variable for each provider, except whichever one is chosen as the base).
In addition, two constants (one for each provider, except whichever one
is chosen as the base) must be calculated. There is no way to calculate
six coefficients and two constants with what is, essentially, just three data
points. Even if there were thousands of observations (cases), they would
all take one of the three forms in Table 4, so they would, for statistical
purposes, be equivalent to just three data points.
TABLE 4: Simulated Data II
Provider
Chosen

Provider 1
Percent for
Complainant

Provider 2
Percent for
Complainant

Provider 3
Percent for
Complainant

1

60%

30%

10%

2

60%

30%

10%

3

60%

30%

10%

With such data, it is mathematically impossible to compute
multinomial logistic regression coefficients.
That suggests that
multinomial logistic regression is not the appropriate method of analysis
here. Multinomial logistic regression is designed for situations where
different choices are appropriate for choosers or situations with different
characteristics. For example, if one were testing whether complainants
from particular countries were more likely to choose particular providers,
multinomial logistic regression would be appropriate, because
complainants from different countries might prefer different providers.
Similarly, if certain case characteristics—such as whether the registrant
was a critic of the trademarked product or company, a fan of the
trademarked product, or simply a cybersquatter—were the independent
variables, multinomial logistic regression would be appropriate. In those
situations, each observation presents a variety of different case
characteristics that make one provider more or less desirable. When
testing the effect of duration and win rates, however, there is little that
distinguishes one observation from another. Duration and win rates do
not vary much, and one would expect that complainants would always
choose the provider with the best combination of win rate and speed. As
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seen above, that would suggest always choosing NAF, which clearly did
not happen.65
In this situation, a more appropriate regression would be a simple
linear regression with market share as the dependent variable and Percent
for the Complainant and Duration as the independent variables. The data
would be the data in Table 1.66 A linear regression with the real UDRP
data produces the results one would expect. The coefficient on Percent
for Complainant is positive (2.1) and the coefficient on Duration is close
to zero (0.02). Of course, with just three observations, one cannot
calculate statistical significance, but the fact that the coefficients make
sense indicates that the approach is more plausible. A slightly more
sophisticated approach replicates the simple linear regression with
monthly data.67 As shown in Table 5, regression results with such data
are clear and in accordance with the informal analysis of the tables and
graphs in the beginning of this section.
TABLE 5: Linear Regression with Monthly Data
Coefficient

Std. Error

P-value

Percent for
Complainant

1.06

0.19

0.000

Duration

1.16

0.27

0.000

Constant

-99.40

20.93

0.000

Observations
Adjusted r

2

51
0.44

As one would expect, the coefficient for Percent for Complainant is
positive and strongly statistically significant. That is, a greater win rate
for the complainant is associated with a greater market share. Each
percentage point increase in the plaintiff win rate is associated with about
one additional percentage point in market share. The coefficient for
duration is positive and strongly statistically significant as well. That is,
slow dispute resolution is associated with greater market share. Each
additional day of average case duration is associated with a one
percentage point in increased market share. This is consistent with the
fact that WIPO had the greatest market share, even though it was the
65. See supra Table 1 (summarizing the key variables).
66. See supra Table 1 (summarizing the key variables).
67. See infra Appendix (presenting the data).
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slowest. Nevertheless, this result is flatly inconsistent with Kesan and
Gallo’s conclusion that complainants chose providers based on
efficiency, speed, or performance.
Similar results are obtained when one uses Percent for Complainant
and Duration for the prior month. This specification is more plausible
because complainants would only have access to data from disputes
resolved before they filed their cases. On the other hand, the fact that
results are so similar for current-month and lagged variables indicates that
it is probably a mistake to use monthly data. Although doing so increases
statistical significance, the analysis is not that different from the simple,
three-observation linear regression first performed, because there is not
much variation over time. As a result, although there are more
sophisticated ways of dealing with time-series data than the simple linear
regressions reported above, they are not worth performing. One must
frankly acknowledge that there are essentially only three observations:
(1) eResolution obtained a small market share with low complainant win
rates and medium speed, (2) WIPO achieved the largest market share with
high complainant win rates and the slowest speed, and (3) NAF received
middling market share with high complainant win rates and the fastest
speed. Those observations are consistent with the idea that complainants
chose based on win rates, but not based on speed. Nevertheless, more
sophisticated statistical analysis is not likely to produce solid results,
because, with the small amount of variation over time, there are really
only these three observations.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Several solutions have been proposed to fix the problem of biased
adjudication under the UDRP. Mueller suggested that “registrars rather
than complainants select the dispute resolution provider.”68 Registrars
are companies, such as GoDaddy and Network Solutions, that register
domain names for consumers and business. As Mueller points out,
“[b]ecause consumers have a choice of registrars, this would introduce
some options for them. If they felt that a particular RSP [resolution
service provider] used by a registrar was biased in favor of trademark
holders, they could take their business elsewhere.”69 Unfortunately, this
solution is likely to lead to bias against trademark owners. Registrars
would have an incentive to choose dispute-resolution providers that
protect existing registrations against trademark owners, and competition
among dispute-resolution providers would give them incentives to favor
68. Mueller, supra note 29, at 161.
69. Id.
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domain-name registrants over trademark owners. Thus, Mueller’s
proposed solution would probably produce a system just as biased as the
current system, although the bias would be in the opposite direction.
Michael Geist argues that the solution is three-member panels rather
than arbitration before a single arbitrator.70 Unfortunately, this solution
would be very costly, as it would require paying three arbitrators rather
than one. The UDRP’s low cost is a key advantage over traditional
litigation, and Geist’s solution would undermine that advantage.
This Article proposes a solution that would borrow from systems
already used routinely for the selection of arbitrators and jurors. Both the
complainant and the respondent could be given the list of ICANNapproved arbitration companies. Each could then strike an equal number
of providers until only one or two providers were left. If only one
provider remained, then that provider would resolve the dispute. If two
providers remained, then ICANN would randomly assign the dispute to
one of those two providers.
More concretely, there are currently five approved dispute resolution
providers.71 If the complainant and respondent each struck two
providers, that would usually leave just one provider, and that provider
would resolve the dispute. Of course, if the complainant and respondent
both struck one of the same arbitration providers, then there would be two
providers who were not eliminated by either party. ICANN would then
choose randomly among those two. If the complainant and respondent
both struck the same two providers, that would leave three providers who
were not struck by either party. The system could then afford each party
one more strike—thus leaving one or two providers. As before, if, after
the second round of strikes, there was only one remaining provider, that
provider would resolve the dispute; if there were two remaining
providers, ICANN would choose randomly between the two. Of course,
if there were more (or fewer) approved dispute resolution providers, the
number of strikes would be modified accordingly, but the procedure
would be the same.
The advantage of this solution is that it would encourage arbitration
providers to be unbiased. Each party would use its strikes to eliminate
the most biased providers, so the most neutral would be chosen more
often. Thus, in contrast to both the present system and to Mueller’s
proposal, this solution would reward neutrality rather than bias. In
addition, unlike Geist’s proposal, this solution would be only slightly
more costly than the current system, because allowing each party to strike
70. Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 36, at 936.
71. List of Approved Providers, supra note 28.
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some providers would cost very little.
V. CONCLUSION
Reanalysis of Kesan and Gallo’s data suggests that complainants did
not choose providers based on speed.72 Kesan and Gallo’s emphasis on
speed is inconsistent with the fact that WIPO had the largest market share,
even though it was the slowest and became even slower over time. While
the data are not conclusive, they provide some support for the idea that
complainants selected providers that were most likely to rule in favor of
the complainant. WIPO and NAF—which ruled for complainants about
80 percent of the time—had the largest market share, while
eResolution—which ruled for complainants only about 60 percent of the
time—had the lowest market share, and its market share declined as its
arbitrators ruled less often for complainants.73 These conclusions are
consistent with the hypothesis of forum selling—that providers tried to
increase their market share by ruling more often for complainants—
although, of course, the actual motive of NAF and WIPO is unknown.
NAF, a for-profit company, had a financial incentive to increase its
caseload.74 WIPO, although a nonprofit, revealed through its marketing
that it wanted more cases. Nevertheless, although both had incentives to
hear more cases, that does not mean that they consciously manipulated
the choice of arbitrators or other factors to favor complainants.75 In
addition, the analysis presented in this Article should be treated
cautiously. As noted in Part III, there is not much variation over time, so
there are essentially only three observations. Quantitative analysis of
such a dataset is necessarily limited.
The problem of bias, if it is real and remains to this day, could be
solved by allowing complainant and respondent to strike an equal number
of arbitration providers, until only one or two providers remained. If
there were two unstruck providers, ICANN would choose among them
randomly. This system would give dispute-resolution providers an
incentive to be unbiased.

72. See supra Part III (reanalyzing Kesan and Gallo’s data).
73. Id.
74. See supra Part I (discussing in detail the UDRP).
75. Although Geist’s and Muscovitch’s analyses suggest that providers did consciously
manipulate the choice of arbitrators to favor complainants, the analysis in this Article does not shed
light on that issue. See generally Geist, Fair.com?, supra note 36 (providing evidence suggesting
providers manipulate the choice of arbitrators in favor of complainants); Muscovitch, supra note
39 (same).
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APPENDIX: Data for Linear Regressions with Monthly Data
Percent
for
Compl.

Duration

Lagged
Percent
Compl.

Lagged
Duration

Month

Provider

Market
Share

Dec.
1999

eResolution

0

eResolution

5.56

eResolution

11.11

eResolution

5.61

83.33

39.83

eResolution

10

60.00

45.40

83.33

39.83

eResolution

8.33

38.89

58.50

60.00

45.40

eResolution

10.97

52.63

59.63

38.89

58.50

eResolution

7.06

53.85

45.54

52.63

59.63

eResolution

7.62

53.33

44.33

53.85

45.54

eResolution

7.85

80.00

44.25

53.33

44.33

eResolution

4.18

66.67

44.54

80.00

44.25

eResolution

6.67

50.00

48.80

66.67

44.54

eResolution

4.65

80.00

47.50

50.00

48.80

eResolution

2.92

55.56

49.89

80.00

47.50

eResolution

1.24

62.50

51.00

55.56

49.89

eResolution

2.33

80.00

52.00

62.50

51.00

eResolution

6.09

83.33

45.67

80.00

52.00

eResolution

5.49

50.00

42.25

83.33

45.67

eResolution

4.71

44.44

39.11

50.00

42.25

NAF

0

NAF

63.89

NAF

44.44

87.50

30.25

NAF

42.86

75.41

38.23

87.50

30.25

NAF

39.44

68.57

37.50

75.41

38.23

NAF

32.14

82.09

37.03

68.57

37.50

NAF

34.18

80.28

36.94

82.09

37.03

Jan.
2000
Feb.
2000
Mar.
2000
Apr.
2000
May
2000
June
2000
July
2000
Aug.
2000
Sept.
2000
Oct.
2000
Nov.
2000
Dec.
2000
Jan.
2001
Feb.
2001
Mar.
2001
Apr.
2001
May
2001
June
2001
Dec.
1999
Jan.
2000
Feb.
2000
Mar.
2000
Apr.
2000
May
2000
June
2000
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2000
Aug.
2000
Sept.
2000
Oct.
2000
Nov.
2000
Dec.
2000
Jan.
2001
Feb.
2001
Mar.
2001
Apr.
2001
May
2001
June
2001
Dec.
1999
Jan.
2000
Feb.
2000
Mar.
2000
Apr.
2000
May
2000
June
2000
July
2000
Aug.
2000
Sept.
2000
Oct.
2000
Nov.
2000
Dec.
2000
Jan.
2001
Feb.
2001
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Provider

Market
Share

Percent
for
Compl.

NAF

30.20

NAF

583

Duration

Lagged
Percent
Compl.

Lagged
Duration

78.05

35.80

80.28

36.94

27.74

84.85

33.85

78.05

35.80

NAF

26.86

80.65

38.15

84.85

33.85

NAF

26.24

82.89

38.13

80.65

38.15

NAF

25.71

82.46

38.05

82.89

38.13

NAF

35.47

92.45

36.40

82.46

38.05

NAF

25.83

87.50

42.45

92.45

36.40

NAF

39.83

77.78

41.15

87.50

42.45

NAF

28.37

79.75

38.87

77.78

41.15

NAF

33.91

82.19

37.74

79.75

38.87

NAF

33.52

85.96

39.93

82.19

37.74

NAF

35.08

80.00

43.90

85.96

39.93

WIPO

100.00

WIPO

30.56

100.00

36.00

WIPO

44.44

85.71

30.86

100.00

36.00

WIPO

51.53

81.25

36.33

85.71

30.86

WIPO

50.56

83.87

41.23

81.25

36.33

WIPO

59.52

78.57

44.84

83.87

41.23

WIPO

54.43

82.18

45.69

78.57

44.84

WIPO

61.57

71.91

52.28

82.18

45.69

WIPO

64.33

77.31

52.13

71.91

52.28

WIPO

64.05

74.77

58.02

77.31

52.13

WIPO

66.54

86.45

57.57

74.77

58.02

WIPO

67.62

82.22

58.41

86.45

57.57

WIPO

59.30

81.58

63.56

82.22

58.41

WIPO

71.25

82.48

65.04

81.58

63.56

WIPO

58.92

81.13

58.17

82.48

65.04
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Month
Mar.
2001
Apr.
2001
May
2001
June
2001

Provider

Market
Share

Percent
for
Compl.

WIPO

68.84

WIPO

[Vol. 48

Duration

Lagged
Percent
Compl.

Lagged
Duration

72.54

59.29

81.13

58.17

59.57

81.82

59.26

72.54

59.29

WIPO

59.89

83.10

59.10

81.82

59.26

WIPO

58.64

76.00

56.83

83.10

59.10

